At a time when our country was finding it’s own voice in the world, struggling to prove to history that a “band of rabble” could rise and forge a new harbor of freedom, tradition from the ancient kingdoms of Europe cast into the pre-industrial fabric that comprised American craftsmanship. The inheritance of swordsmanship, both as an aristocratic institution and military practice, imported it’s way into the fledgling cities still echoing with the sweat of hammer and saw. Throughout the late eighteenth century, the majority of swords worn by American soldiers and aristocracy were imported from manufacturing centers in Europe. The United States government had no significant contracts with regional armories, and swords that were crafted in the US were often comprised of imported blades and locally fitted handles. By the end of the Civil War, however, the US government had ordered 389,957 swords within four years, 210,793 of which were made by American manufacturers. The compelling development of the American sword industry was enabled by a developing system of manufacture, division of labor, and innovation not only consonant to larger US industries, but conducive to the American System of manufacture.    

            The American Sword Industry and it’s eventual dominance with military contracts is anchored in the industrial revolution. To understand its evolution, it is useful to examine the underlying cultural shifts within early America that allowed and contributed to industrial growth. These changes are the essential preface of industry, the early onset of which began occurring before the American Revolution. The destiny of American sword manufacture is rooted in these changes, and cannot be separated from the narrative of industrial growth.      

Colonial America was a place of increasing conflict between the Old World and new sensibilities. Although the inherited paternalistic and hierarchical dependency ties still existed in the mid-1700s, there were several antecedents which influenced the loosening of these ties, including land ownership, travel among colonies, no oppressive established church, and an inherited disillusion with absolute monarchy.

            The unique characteristics of land both in use and natural resources were a major factor in the rise of American industry. Although land influenced industry after the revolution by providing natural resources, necessitating transportation, and instilling attitudes of “greater consumerism” for individual ownership, land use also contributed to loosening the ties of paternalism before the revolution. Some two-thirds of colonialists owned land compared to one-fifth of the population in England. This greatly reduced the tenant-rental farmer dependency that was a crucial element in paternalistic society. Farmers produced their goods on their own terms; for example Scottish merchant began buying goods directly from private farmers, cutting out the aristocratic middleman.

            Travel and transportation also impacted the growth of American industry. After the revolution, wide spaces and increasing acquisition of land nessicitated innovation in industrial canal-building, steam engine design, railroad development, and naval design. However, before the revolution vast land and travel impacted the private nature of contracts and debts, which in turn diluted paternalism. Colonists began to word contracts in an impersonal way. This fit well in New England, where a basis for Puritan religion was a contract between the saved and God. In this sense, the higher duty was not to a secular superior, but to a contract. For example, during the French and Indian war English military commanders were surprised when New Englanders left rank if they felt their contract was breached. To the commanders, hierarchical duty was most important; to the New Englanders their duty was to their contract. The establishment of detailed, impersonal contracts in business relations during the 1700’s waned duty to superiors simply out of traditional hierarchy, and the set up of the “language” of industry.

            During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the United States was ready for industrial growth. However, the primary factors which enabled the American Sword Industry to out-compete foreign importers reveals not only a microcosm of larger US industries, but shows the sword industry on the “cutting” edge of many trends that drove the US industrial revolution itself.

            The first powered machinery in US factories such as Stagle’s textile mills, Ames Tool factory, Nathan Starr’s Armory, Eli Whitney’s early attempts at cotton-gin mass production (which failed incidentally), and Harper’s Ferry Armory were simple, water powered machines. However, as the nineteenth century progressed, steam began to facilitate power, and factories utilized larger forging facilities. For this, significant amounts of fuel were needed. It is here that the importance of America’s vast wood reserves can be seen. Not just as a building material but as the source behind charcoal. Because wood was abundant, charcoal could be made cheaply, giving the United States a decided edge in fuel costs and availability. However, even the abundance of charcoal was not enough out-compete foreign suppliers of the most important material in sword manufacture: steel. The validation of the sword industry as an autonomous entity free of foreign commission is directly dictated by the progression of American steel manufacture. 

During the 18^th century, English producers of iron and steel originated several innovations that improved quality and out-put. Interestingly, American foundries did not catch these innovations readily because of their abundance of cheap labor, which actually stagnated advances in steel fabrication. This phenomenon can be seen in the British innovation of “puddling”. Puddling used a reverberatory furnace in which fuel was separated from metal with a low wall. Because metal and fuel were not in contact, the product was purer in quality. It was soon discovered that rolling grooves could refine the iron, and the labor-intensive process of refining by hammering was reduced. It is here that a difference between American foundries and British foundries can be explained; America had an abundance of cheap labor, and it is possible they did not adopt this labor-saving method early because they didn’t have the need to. In addition, the laborsaving qualities of puddling was offset by the large amount of material wasted, approximately one half of the original iron. This was largely due to the use of sand as a collection basin at the bottom of the furnace. In 1818, it was discovered that an iron basin could be used efficiently, saving more material. This eventually enabled the American iron and steel industry to increase production in the 1830’s.  Steel, which melted at a higher temperature than iron, came mostly in the form of “blister” steel (named because of its appearance) before the turn of the nineteenth century. Well suited for sword manufacture, blister steel was created by refining wrought iron to add carbon. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, “crucible steel” was being created in America by melting blister steel in clay crucibles. However, the process was expensive, and American steel consumers, including sword manufacturers, continued to favor European steel until the expansion of the American steel industry beginning in the 1830s. Eventually, the invention of the Bessemer process, introduced to the general public in 1857, enabled greater development in American steel. This was a method of blowing air through the molten metal, allowing steel to be manufactured by American firms on a competitive level with Europe.

            Because the US mostly imported steel in the early nineteenth century, swords makers were dictated to by foreign prices. During this time, Americans attempted unsuccessfully to produce steel of good quality on a large scale. England and Sweden dominated the American steel market for higher-grade steel until the mid-nineteenth century. Manufacturers that required good quality steel such as Harper’s Ferry Armory and the toolmakers at Ames Company found American steel wanting in quality. For example, Colt’s Armory bought imported steel well into the 1860’s despite a thirty- percent tariff set in 1861. Colt felt that the uniformity of imported steel was worth the extra tariffs because it allowed them to harden parts without having to readjust temperatures and quenching times for each individual shipment.

            American makers had trouble commuting the British process early on for three reasons. First, they needed ore with appropriate sulfur and phosphorous content. Swedish iron was well suited for this, and British firms controlled the iron market with long-term contracts. Second, the crucibles needed for moving the liquid steel while fulfilling the chemical requirements for crucible steel were best made from English Stourbridge clay, which Americans had a difficult time obtaining. Third, the Americans were in need of experienced crucible-steel melters. Only by the mid-nineteenth century did American foundries begin to have workers with experience and expertise equivalent to those in Europe. Once the American Steel Industry established itself as a viable competitor, however, the Sword Industry no longer had to rely on European source for their raw materials.

            As early as the thirteenth century, Solingen in Germany was famous for it’s production of quality swords. In the 1600’s England attempted to create sword-manufacturing centers in Hounslaw and County Durham by relocating German craftsmen, although the area of Shefflied eventually dominated English blade production. Similarly, France established the manufactory at Klingenthal in 1729 by relocating smiths from Solingen. These European centers dominated American sword imports through the revolution and into the early 1800’s, when the fledgling American Sword industry began to gain footing.

                        Beginning in the early 1800’s, American Sword manufacturers adopted increasingly advanced and efficient forms of production. At Ames Sword Company the hand-forged method of shaping was replaced by water-powered trip hammers. In addition, individual grinding wheels were connected by mechanized pulley systems. As armories such as Harper’s Ferry and Nathan Starr’s factory increased in size and production, local craftsmen were recruited in the system as skilled laborers. The individual contracts of apprenticeship and journeyman began to take place within the armories themselves, creating systems that produced greater numbers of skilled laborers. The increased efficiency and production was in direct relation to the increased demand by the United States Government for military swords. For example, In 1798 the United States Government signed Nathan Starr of Middletown, Connecticut, to a contract for 2000 Calvary swords, increasing to 10,600 by 1818. Interestingly, with the exception of the 1913 Calvary sword designed by George Patton and the model 1918 naval cutlass, no enlisted men’s swords were ever created in federal arsenals; all were manufactured by civilian contractors.

            Sword makers and armorers met the increased demand for swords and other weapons by employing techniques perfected within the armories themselves. The concept of interchangeability, the most outspoken proponent of which was Eli Whitney, began to work its way into armories in the early 1820’s and 30’s. Interchangeability and increased division of labor formed what became known as the “American System” of production. By 1850, many industries such as steel and textiles employed this method, but one of the first successful adaptations of this system took place within Springfield Armory in Massachusetts.

            During the 1790’s Springfield Armory had small degrees of labor division, using methods of production rooted in individual craftsmen shops. By 1815 Springfield had 36 divisions of labor, growing to 100 by 1825, and 400 in 1855. In 1819 Springfield mechanic Thomas Blanchard invented a turning lathe which copied an original piece, dispersing its pattern for quicker production. Over the next six years, Blanchard invented fourteen separate machines, largely mechanizing production in the facility. During these years similar patterns followed in other armories and sword manufacturing centers. In 1816 Simeon North’s arms factory invented a milling machine for accurately cutting metal. By the early 1820’s, Harper’s Ferry armory improved upon the design, drastically reducing the need for skilled labor. This conversion met some resistance as craftsmen were replaced by lower-wage workmen capable of running the machines unburdened by the arduous path of apprenticeship. However, managers could no longer ignore the cost effectiveness of mechanization.  

            On June 5^th, 1832 the United States Ordinance Department signed the Ames Manufacturing Company to a contract requiring 2,000 artillery swords in one year. During that time, Ames craftsman Madison Kendall was removed from the regular work force and given the task of forging, grinding, and tempering all 2,000 blades. Similar to the individual craftsman method of production, Kendall produced the blades using only one assistant. Upon completion of the rough grinding and heat-treating, blades were sent to the Springfield Armory for polishing. Subcontractors were employed by Ames to complete other stages of production such as hilt-fitting and scabbard creation. Although Ames was able to fulfill its contract in this manner, these methods created problems in communication and quality control. Satisfied that Ames had met its contract obligations, the Ordinance Department signed Ames to another 2,000 swords. At this point, Ames realized the old method of individual workmanship could no longer meet the demand for product. Ames began gearing their facilities, workforce, and technology towards mass-production. For example, in 1835 steel expert Nathaniel Perkins visited Ames to relate information on more efficient methods of annealing de-carbonized steel. In addition, Ames began rearranging their workforce in anticipation of potential contracts. By the mid-1850s, Ames and other armories fully adopted mechanization into their production. By doing this, they were able to meet the increased demand for swords required by Ordinance Department contracts. By the end of the Civil War, a competitive, self-contained American sword industry was in place.

            The adoption of the American System of manufacture within the American sword industry not only paralleled other US industries, but evolved in such a way that major contributions to the American System took place within the armories themselves. Mechanization, division of labor, and interchangeability arose reciprocally with increased demand for goods. These characteristics, combined with a high quality of homogenous domestic steel created a thriving, self-contained sword industry. In the end, the American Sword Industry was free from foreign dictation, abound with innovation, and forged its place in a world built by mice and men.